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STRICT FORECLOSURE OF REAL ESTATE
MORTGAGES IN ILLINOIS
VINCENT C. BALDWIN'
AT present, in the majority of the states of the Union,
no method exists, either at law or in equity, by
which the mortgagee can be adjudged the absolute owner
of the mortgaged premises; hence, strict foreclosure as
known at common law is no longer possible. The legis-
latures of many states have provided the method by
which mortgages shall be foreclosed; and where the
statutes specifically set forth the method, each act done
in pursuance thereto must rest upon statutory authoriza-
tion. Thus, Section 8172 of the Code of Iowa provides
that "when a mortgage or deed of trust is foreclosed,
the court shall render judgment for the entire amount
found to be due, and must direct the mortgaged prop-
erty . . . to be sold." According to the American &
English Encyclopaedia of Law, strict foreclosure is
usual in only two of the states-New Hampshire and
Vermont, but it is permitted under exceptional cases in
six others. 2 Strict foreclosure remained the prevalent
mode in England until the enactment of Statutes 15 and
16 Victoria C. 86 (Par. 48), known as the Chancery
Improvement Act, and the Conveyancing Act 44 and 45
Victoria C. 41 which provided that in an action for fore-
closure or for redemption, the court, on request of the
mortgagee or of any person interested in the right of
redemption may, in its discretion, direct a sale of the
mortgaged property on such terms as it thinks fit, in-
cluding if it deems necessary, a deposit in court of a
reasonable sum to meet the expenses of the sale and to
secure the performance of its terms.
The courts of Illinois recognize both the legal and
equitable theories of a mortgage. Thus, at law, the mort-
gage is regarded as a conveyance of the legal title to the
creditor who takes it with the usual incidents. Upon
breach of condition, the mortgagee may oust the mort-
gagor from possession of the premises and the former's
I Graduate student, Chicago-Kent College of Law.
2 Vol. VIII, 186-7 pp.
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title becomes absolute subject only to the latter's equity
of redemption.3 On the equity side, the mortgage is con-
sidered as but a mere security and is no more than an
incident to the debt or principle obligation. The trend
of our judicial opinion, however, has veered more and
more towards the equitable doctrines and away from the
legal conception of the mortgage. For example, in the
case of Barrett v. linckley4 it was said.
It must not be concluded, from what we have said,
that the dual system respecting mortgages, as above ex-
plained, exists in this state precisely as it did in England
prior to its adoption in this country, for such is not the
case. It is a conceded fact that the equitable theory of a
mortgage has in process of time made in this state, as in
others, material encroachments upon the legal theory,
which are now fully recognized in courts of law.
Thus, it is now settled law that the mortgagor or his as-
signee is the legal owner of the mortgaged estate as
against all persons except the mortgagee or his assigns.
Likewise, it has been held that the mortgagee has no
such estate as can be sold on execution, nor does his
widow enjoy any right to dower in it; upon his death,
the mortgage passes to his personal representatives as
personal property and may be bequeathed as such.
Whereas the mortgagor's interest may be sold on execu-
tion, it is subject to dower rights; it can be devised or
will pass by descent to the mortgagor 's heirs at law.
In the last analysis, the title of the mortgagee is anom-
alous and exists only between him and the mortgagor
and then only for the purpose of securing the mortgage
debt. When the debt is barred by the statute of limita-
tions, the mortgage estate perishes both at law and in
equity, which proves conclusively that the mortgage title
is measured 5 by the existence of the indebtedness or
obligation which it secures. Nor is the mortgagee 's
title of such a character as to necessitate a reconveyance
from him to the mortgagor in order to revest the latter
with complete title when the mortgage debt has been
satisfied.6 Of course, a release of the mortgagee's inter-
I Kransz v. Uedelhofen, 193 Il1. 477.
1 124 Ill. 32.
* Llghteap v. Bradley, 186 I1. 510; Schumann v. Sprague, 189 Ill. 425.
o Frankenthal v. Mayer, 54 Il1. App. 160.
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est may be evidenced by a written instrument, but an
entry of satisfaction upon the margin of the record is
equally effective.7
The courts of Illinois have, even in their earliest deci-
sions, consistently, and zealously protected the mort-
gagor's equity of redemption. In the case of Bearss,
et al. v. Ford,s Justice Mulkey stated:
But it is evident that parties cannot by mere agree-
ment change the law of the land. Every deed or other
instrument takes effect from its delivery and its charac-
ter thereby becomes at once fixed. If a mortgage when
delivered, it continues to be such until the right of re-
demption is barred by some of the modes recognized by
law. Hence, nothing is more firmly established in the
law of mortgages than that it is not competent for the
parties even by express stipulation to cut off the right
of redemption, and to permit them to make such an in-
strument an absolute deed upon some future contingency
would simply be cutting off the right of redemption
which, as we have just seen, cannot be done.
What, then, are some of the recognized modes of fore-
closure, or better, the remedies available to the mort-
gagee upon condition broken, in Illinois? According to
J. Breese, in Carroll v. Ballance,9 the mortgagee, upon
default in the payment of his indebtedness or upon con-
dition broken, may
proceed personally against the debtor on the mortgage
note and subject his general property to the judgment
or he may bring ejectment on condition broken, or make
peaceable entry; or file a bill in chancery for a strict
foreclosure; for a foreclosure and sale, or if he prefers
it, sue on a scire facias.
These remedies, it has been held, are concurrent and
successive at the election of the mortgagee. Inasmuch
as the scope of this paper is limited to the single rem-
edy of strict foreclosure, the discussion will be confined
to it.
The courts of this country have almost universally
referred to strict foreclosure as a harsh and stringent
Rev. Stat. Ill. Ch. 95, par. 89.
' 108 Iln. 16.
926 Il1. 9.
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remedy. 10 A recent Appellate Court case in Illinois has
stressed this opinion by holding that
strict foreclosures are not encouraged by the law; in
some jurisdictions the remedy can be resorted to only
when all the parties in interest consent and agree to it,
in others that there are no judgment creditors or pur-
chasers of the equity of redemption who have the right
to redeem, and in still others, the remedy is absolutely
forbidden by law; in Illinois there is no statute regulating
strict foreclosure and we are therefore governed by the
common law and the trend of judicial decision in this
state."
The Supreme Court of Illinois, in the leading case of
Lightcap v. Bradley,'12 observed that while a strict fore-
closure was permissible in a court of equity, if the cir-
cumstances justified it, still it was only in use to a very
limited extent and then only under extraordinary cir-
cumstances. It is the only vestige of the former common
law foreclosure remaining in the law of Illinois. As
early as 1855, the courts of the state had judicially de-
clared that although equity may grant relief by way of
a strict foreclosure, the practice should not be encour-
aged.' 3 The granting of such relief, however, is discre-
tionary With the court. But, when the interests of both
parties manifestly require it, it will hardly ever be re-
fused.' 4
In general, a decree of strict foreclosure may be en-
tered in Illinois when the four following facts have been
made to appear: first, that the mortgagor is insolvent;
second, that the mortgaged land is not worth the amount
due upon the mortgage; third, that the mortgagee is
willing to take the property in satisfaction of his debt;
fourth, that the decree will not jeopardize the rights of
junior incumbrancers, purchasers of the equity, or judg-
ment creditors of the mortgagor who might benefit by
"
0Bolles v. Duff, 43 N. Y. 469; Warner Bros. Co. v. Freud, 138 Cal.
651; Harrington v. Birdsall, 38 Neb. 176; Wilder v. Haughey, 21 Minn.
101; Hazard v. Robinson, 15 R. I. 226; Hunt v. Lewin, 4 Stew. & P.
(Ala.) 138.
"Rabbit v. First National Bank of Rock Falls, 237 Ill. App. 289.
11 186 Ill. 510.
11 Weiner v. Heintz, 17 Ill. 259.
14 Johnson v. Donnell, 15 I1. 97; Stephens v. Bichnell, 27 Ill. 444;
Flagg v. Walker, 113 U. S. 659,
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having the property put up for sale, thereby subjecting
it to the payment of as many debts as possible.15
Where the bill shows that the mortgage was given for
the entire purchase money of the mortgaged premises
and that the value thereof is not in excess of the amount
due on the mortgage, it is a proper case for strict fore-
closure even if no appearance has been entered for the
mortgagor.16 Similar relief was granted where all per-
sons who derived title through the mortgagor disclaimed
any interest in the foreclosed realty and tendered it to
the mortgagee, even though the time during which he
might have demanded a master's deed out of the original
foreclosure had expired.' 7 And, where the parties to
foreclosure proceedings have stipulated for a decree of
strict foreclosure and have agreed that the court shall
enter it, the defendants are not entitled to complain that
the decree allowed them only six months in which to pay
the principal of the note before barring their equity of
redemption.' 8 A decree of strict foreclosure will lie not
only in favor of a mortgagee but also in favor of the
holder or holders of notes or other evidences of indebt-
edness secured by a trust deed encumbering the pledged
real estate.19
While the earlier cases on the subject have quite uni-
formly suggested that the insolvency of the mortgagor
constituted a proper case for strict foreclosure when
coupled with the other circumstances enumerated under
the general rule, there was room to doubt whether such
insolvency was an indispensable element until the deci-
sion in Rabbit v. First National Bank of Rock Falls.20
Here the court said:
It is manifest that if the mortgaged premises are
ample security for the mortgage debt, there would be no
ground for strict foreclosure and this is true even though
the mortgagor be insolvent, and so, if the mortgaged
premises be not ample security for the mortgage debt,
orner v. Zimmerman, 45 Ill. 14; Farrell v. Parlier, 50 Il1. 274;
Gorham v. Farson, 119 Ill. 425; Carpenter v. Plagge, 192 Il1. 82;
Griesbaum v. Banum, 18 Il1. App. 614; Rexroat v. Ford, 201 Ii. App. 342.
"0 Wilson v. Geisler, 19 Ill. 49.
" Belleville Savings Bank v. Reis, 136 Il1. 242.
"3 Bissell v. Marine Co., 55 Ill. 165.
19 Rabbit v. First National Bank of Rock Falls, 237 Ill. App. 289,
20 IbidZ.
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there would be no justification for a strict foreclosure if
the mortgagee were solvent. It would be manifestly in-
equitable to deprive him of the right of redemption
when he has ample means to do so. These two sugges-
tions show the logic of the union of these two elements
before strict foreclosure is proper. But their union
would not be sufficient without the third, i. e. the creditor
must take the property in satisfaction of his debt and
the costs. We have already held that strict foreclosure
can't be granted unless it is alleged and proved that the
owner of the land was insolvent and we certainly can't
indulge ourselves in a presumption that they are in-
solvent and unable to redeem.
In the light of the underlying decisions that strict fore-
closure is sanctionable whenever the interests of both
parties manifestly require it, the conclusiveness of the
rule is to be questioned. Undeniably, the rule would
operate to preclude a strict foreclosure if the property
were valued at more than the mortgage debt and the
mortgagor were insolvent, for it is the policy and object
of the statute allowing redemptions from judicial sales
to make the property pay as many of the mortgagor's
debts as it is worth. 1 But, assume the hypothesis that
the mortgagor is solvent with his assets somewhat
frozen; that there are no jurior encumbrances, creditors,
or lien claimants interested in the mortgaged property;
and that while the property may or may not be worth
more than the mortgage debt, no ready sale can be had
of it due to inactivity or depression in the real estate
market, and the mortgagee is willing to take his chances
with it and the mortgagor is agreeable so long as he is
released from liability on the notes of indebtedness. In
such a hypothetical case it is doubtful whether a court
of equity would refuse to decree strict foreclosure merely
because the complainant could not clearly show that the
mortgagor was insolvent.
If it is sufficiently proved that the value of the mort-
gaged property is greater than the amount of the indebt-
edness, there can be no strict foreclosure under the
Illinois practice.22 The value of the realty is a matter
21 Garden City Sand Co. v. Christley, 289 Ill. 617.
Gorham v. Farson, 119 Ill. 425.
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of proof to be ascertained by the master; and, in estab-
lishing it, the opinions of witnesses competent to testify
on the point may be heard.23 Where the evidence is con-
flicting, and it is debatable whether or not the land is
worth the equivalent of the mortgage encumbrance, the
court has said:
Upon a strict foreclosure, if the value of the land be
equal to the debt, the debt is considered as satisfied, but
it does not operate as an extinguishment of the debt
unless the land is of equal value. It is, not infrequently,
a matter of agreement between the mortgagor and mort-
gagee, the land being about equal to the debt, that
there shall be a strict foreclosure, in which case no
equity of redemption remains.
24
The fact that the mortgagee has his choice of rem-
edies, as heretofore outlined, either to enforce his lien
upon the mortgaged premises or to have his debt satis-
fied out of the mortgagor's general assets, conclusively
demonstrates that he must be willing as expressed in his
pleadings to take the property in discharge of his debt
before the court can consider the propriety of pro-
nouncing a decree of strict foreclosure. In Farrell v.
Parlier, the doctrine was expressed in this language:
"Such a decree is not proper unless the mortgagee is
willing to take the property in satisfaction of his whole
claim. ''25
The general rule that strict foreclosure is not permis-
sible when there are junior encumbrances or creditors,
or purchasers of the equity of redemption, 26 is not with-
out exception. Witness the statement of the court in
the case of Illinois Starch Co. v. Ottawa Hydraulic Co.:
"The court of conscience will not sacrifice or endanger
the rights of a complainant who comes within her portals
with a just cause, and holding the oldest and preferred
lien and best equity, for a bare possibility of a wholly
improbable benefit to one having a second lien and sub-
ordinate equity. ' 2 7 In a later case the Appellate Court
McCormick v. Higgins, 190 Ill. App. 241.
Vansant v. Allmon, 23 Ill. 30.
2 50 ill. 274.
SEdwards v. Helm, 5 Ill. 142; Horner v. Zimmerman, 45 ill. 14;
Boyer v. Boyer, 89 Il1. 447; Griesbaum v. Baum, 18 Il1. App. 614;
Barnes v. Ward, 190 Il. App. 392.
v125 I1. 237.
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ruled that when there is no possibility of any benefit
accruing to the judgment creditor from an ordinary fore-
closure, it is unreasonable and inequitable to penalize
the holder of a first lien by making him pay unnecessary
costs for which he will have no chance of being reim-
bursed due to the insufficiency of the value of the real
estate and the insolvency of the mortgagor.28
In cases where the mortgagor is dead and his estate
is insolvent, and the equity of redemption has descended
to infant heirs, the proper course is to order the prop-
erty sold and not to decree a strict foreclosure.2 9 It
should likewise be denied when the mortgaged estate
is claimed as a homestead, or materially exceeds in value
the amount for which it was encumbered; and unless the
homestead right has been waived, the sale should be made
subject to itA0
The statutes of Illinois provide that no decree of strict
foreclosure can be made upon a mortgage executed by
a guardian on the real estate of his ward, but such mort-
gages must be foreclosed by petition presented to the
county court, allowing redemption therefrom as is now
provided by law in cases of sales under executions upon
common law judgments.31 It is likewise provided in the
statutes that strict foreclosures of mortgages given un-
der court authority by executors or conservators of the
estates of lunatics, idiots, or spendthrifts are forbid-
den.832  But, it is entirely proper for a mortgage exe-
cuted by a trustee who holds title to the mortgaged
property to be the subject of strict foreclosure. For
example, in the case of Terre Haute Trust Company v.
Wells Whip Company, et al.,3 a mortgage made by
trustees under proper authority had been foreclosed upon
decree of strict foreclosure and parties claiming under
the title of said trustee and by devolution from it were
estopped from insisting that the foreclosure proceedings
were invalid because the beneficiaries under the trust
had not been made parties to it. In that case, the con-
Rexroat v. Ford, 201 Ill. App. 342; Moffet v. Farwell, 222 Iln. 543.
Boyer v. Boyer, 89 Ill. 447.
Young v. Graff, 28 Inl. 20.
-Rev. Stat. Ill., Ch. 64, par. 27.
Rev. Stat. Ill., Ch. 3, par. 124 and Ch. 86, par. 22.
"210 Ill. App. 602.
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testants had failed to make the beneficiaries parties in
their cross bill whereby the invalidity of the mortgage
was sought to be established.
The frame of a bill for a strict foreclosure is nearly
the same as that for a sale. The prayer, however, is
different. It prays that an account may be taken of
what is due the complainant on his mortgage and that
the mortgagor may be decreed to pay the amount found
due by a short day to be appointed by the court, or in
default thereof, that the mortgagor and all claiming un-
der him be precluded and deprived of their equity of
redemption.
The settled practice in England on proceedings for a
strict foreclosure as described in Smith's Chancery Prac-
tice was to decree a reference to the master to take an
account and tax costs,
directing that if same are paid by the mortgagor at
such time and place as the master shall fix, the mortgagee
is to reconvey the premises by orders in default of pay-
ment at such time and place that the mortgagor be abso-
lutely foreclosed from all equity of redemption in the
mortgaged premises. . . . On the day appointed,
either the mortgagee, or one duly authorized by him
under a power of attorney, attends at the place appointed
to receive the money, and remains there until the ex-
piration of the time appointed. . . . If the mortgage
money is not paid, the plaintiff, upon an affidavit of hav-
,ing duly attended and of the non-payment of the money,
is entitled to an order on a motion as of course, that the
defendant do from henceforth stand absolutely debarred
and foreclosed of and from all right, title, suit, and equity
of redemption of, in, or to the said mortgaged premises.34
The plaintiff must, however, in order to complete his
title, procure a final order confirming it, otherwise the
decree of foreclosure will not be pleadable.3 5 Courts of
equity, acting in good conscience, invariably allowed the
defendant some measure of time within which to effect
a redemption by tendering the amount due on the mort-
gage indebtedness plus the taxed costs. The length of
this period rested largely in the discretion of the chan-
cellor who customarily fixed it according to the circum-
"I Smith, Chancery Practice (7th ed.) 781.
"Daniell's Chancery Practice Vol. 2-4th Am. Ed.
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stances of the particular case, but in no case could it be
entirely withheld. The practice early grew up of allow-
ing six months or longer for this period of redemption.
Thus, it is seen that, in England, two decrees were re-
quired to perfect a strict foreclosure: first, an interlocu-
tory decree ordering a foreclosure if the debt be not paid
within a stipulated period and, second, a final order of
foreclosure upon proof that the money had not been paid
as initially decreed.
In Illinois, the courts have not considered that two
such decrees are necessary. The courts of this state
have contented themselves by adjudging in a single and
final decree that, if the indebtedness secured by the
mortgage be not repaid with interest within a specified
term after the date of the decree, the defendants shall be
forever barred and foreclosed of all right and equity of
redemption in and to the said premises and every part
thereof; and thereupon all the right, title, and interest-
both legal and equitable-shall be and become vested,
absolutely and forever, unconditionally in the said com-
plainant. In the words of the court in Ellis et al. v. Leek:
Although courts of chancery, in this state, are governed
by the same practice as courts of chancery in England,
or by rules and regulations consistent with such prac-
tice, we are unable to see wherein the practice here
adopted is so inconsistent with that in England, as laid
down by authors on chancery practice, as that it should
be condemned. Under the one practice the title is vested
in the complainant by an order in the decree; under the
order, by a final order made subsequently."
It has even been held that a decree of strict foreclosure
need not stipulate in whom the legal title shall be vested,
for by cutting off the equity of redemption, it confirms
the title of the mortgagee.3 7 Under this practice, it is
to be noted that a reconveyance from the mortgagee is
required, if a redemption is tendered within the period
allowed for it after the date of the decree, and a provi-
sion for this should be made in the decree itself.
A decree of strict foreclosure which fails to find the
"127 Ill. 60. See also Mulvey v. Gibbons, et al., 87 Il. 367; Chick-
ering, et al. v. Failes, 26 Ill. 508.
"Johnion v. Donnell, 15 Ill. 97.
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amount due under the mortgage and which allows no
time during which the ascertained debt is to be paid and
the mortgagor's estate redeemed from the decree, has
been held unsustainable1s Hence, any such decree which
is final and conclusive in the first instance can be set
aside. In Illinois, no standard period, within which the
mortgagor may enjoy the right to effect a redemption
after the decree, has been definitely fixed upon. It has
been held that a month was too short a period for pay-
ment on rendition of a decree of strict foreclosure.3
The Appellate Court in another case, where the mort-
gagors had consented to the entry of a decree of strict
foreclosure and the decree had ordered them to convey
the mortgaged premises by warranty deed within five
days thereafter, upheld the contested decree despite its
extreme effect.40 But, it has been repeatedly held that
in the case of an irredeemable sale of real estate, not
less than ninety days should be given.4' The duration
of this period should be determined with a view to the
amount of the indebtedness and in the same ratio, that
is, the larger the debt, the longer the period. When the
grantee of a mortgagor, served by publication only, ii
a foreclosure of the mortgage out of which a decree of
strict foreclosure allowing a ninety-day period of re-
demption defaults, he is entitled to file his petition for
leave to answer within three years after the rendition
of the decree as provided for in Section 19 of the Chaii-
cery Act. 42
A decree of foreclosure must correspond with the mort-
gage and with the allegations of the bill and the evi-
dence, or it will be reversible for error. If the court
possessed jurisdiction, the decree will be supported by
all the presumptions of regularity and validity with
which public policy invests judicial sentences. There-
fore, if the decree is not void, although erroneous or
irregular, it will not b.e open to collateral attach or im-
peachment. 43
" Clark v. Reyburn, 8 Wall. 318.
" Brahin v. Dietsch, 15 Ill. App. 331.
"Barnes v. Ward, 190 Ill. App. 392.
" Farrell v. Parlier, 50 Ill. 275.
' Scott v. Milliken, et al., 60 Ill. 112.
Black on Mortgages in Illinois.
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Thus, bona fide purchasers for value from complainant
under a strict foreclosure are unaffected by an error in
the decree, as announced by the court in Homer v. Zim-
merman, "As he was a bona fide purchaser for value
without notice, his partition can't be assailed nor af-
fected by any error in the decree should there be one."
44
But, he acquires no clearer or stronger title than the
mortgagee had taken from the mortgagor upon the exe-
cution of the mortgage. 45
That the practice of strict foreclosure has been in dis-
use in Illinois is evidenced by the dearth of recent cases
wherein the relief was sought. Because of certain unfor-
tunate economic conditions prevalent today, however,
it is quite likely that the remedy will again be commonly
resorted to. Indeed, it would seem to be decidedly ex-
pedient in current foreclosure practice. When the value
of real estate so drastically declines as has been the ex-
perience in most of our larger cities of late-owing to
excessive speculation in building construction and real-
estate subdivision-many property owners are rendered
insolvent, mortgages go into default, and wholesale fore-
closure becomes the order of the day. Under such cir-
cumstances, the utility of the practice of seeking relief
for the mortgagee or the bond- or note-holders, secured
by the mortgage or the trust deed, by way of a strict
foreclosure becomes manifest. Courts of equity have
always tried to protect parties before them with just
causes from the accrual of useless and unnecessary
costs. Wherever the remedy of strict foreclosure can
be properly prayed for in accordance with the rules
which have been hereinbefore reviewed and commented
upon, great delay and expense can be avoided by pur-
suing it. Again employing the language of the court,
"If, however, the value of the land does not equal the
amount of the debt, no decree of sale should be made;
that would be useless and make *unnecessary costs. To
have foreclosed the mortgages in the ordinary method
would have made a bill of unnecessary and useless
costs." ' 46  But, over and above these considerations,
"45 Ill. 14.
"MeMahill v. Torrence, 163 Inl. 277.
" Scott v. Milliken, 60 I1. 112; Barnes v. Ward, 190 Ill. App. 392.
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many cases will come up wherein it would be more ad-
vantageous to the mortgagee expeditiously to assume the
ownership and management of the mortgaged premises
in his own right after the mortgagor's default and in-
solvency, despite the inadequacy of the value of the prop-
erty to satisfy the mortgage indebtedness at that time
than to have the property judicially sold, thereby sus-
taining an immediate loss on his investment. For in-
stance, it may be found that by economical management;
by the making of necessary repairs; or even by renovat-
ing, adding to, or remodeling the improvements in the
mortgaged premises, the income may be increased to the
point where the mortgagee's investment can be entirely
recouped. In such cases, the sooner the insolvent mort-
gagor's equity of redemption and right to possession
are terminated, the better the mortgagee's chances of
liquidating his debt. If the mortgagor is permitted to
remain in occupancy, the premises might suffer undue
depreciation because of his inability adequately to main-
tain them. If the property produces an income, a re-
ceivership, to be sure, may be had, but receiverships are
expensive and rarely satisfactory. The mortgagee's
surest and quickest relief, therefore, in face of these
conditions, would be by way of a strict foreclosure.
